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ABSTRACT
A proposal to improve routing security—Route Origin Au-
thorization (ROA)—has been standardized. A ROA specifies
which network is allowed to announce a set of Internet des-
tinations. While some networks now specify ROAs, little is
known about whether other networks check routes they re-
ceive against these ROAs, a process known as Route Origin
Validation (ROV). Which networks blindly accept invalid
routes? Which reject them outright? Which de-preference
them if alternatives exist?
Recent analysis attempts to use uncontrolled experiments
to characterize ROV adoption by comparing valid routes
and invalid routes [5]. However, we argue that gaining a
solid understanding of ROV adoption is impossible using
currently available data sets and techniques. Instead, we de-
vise a verifiable methodology of controlled experiments for
measuring ROV. Our measurements suggest that, although
some ISPs are not observed using invalid routes in uncon-
trolled experiments, they are actually using different routes
for (non-security) traffic engineering purposes, without per-
forming ROV. We conclude with presenting three AS that
do implement ROV as confirmed by the operators.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Routing protocols; Network measurement; Se-
curity protocols; Public Internet ;
KEYWORDS
BGP, RPKI, routing policies, Internet security
1 INTRODUCTION
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [17] is responsible
for establishing Internet routes, yet it does not check that
routes are valid. An autonomous system (AS) can hijack
destinations it does not control by announcing invalid routes
to them, either intentionally or unintentionally, as in the
well-known accidental announcement of YouTube’s address
space by Pakistan Telecom [2].
Because this critical aspect of the Internet is vulnerable,
there are proposals to improve routing security [7], and one—
the RPKI—is standardized and is in early adoption. The
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [12] is a spe-
cialized PKI to help secure Internet interdomain routing by
providing attestation objects for Internet resource holders
(i.e., IP prefixes and AS numbers). The RPKI publishes
Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects, each specifying
which AS is allowed to announce an IP prefix. Using ROA
data, a BGP router can perform RPKI-based origin vali-
dation (ROV) verifying whether the AS originating an IP
prefix announcement in BGP is authorized to do so [14] and
labeling the route as valid or invalid. The validity of a route
can be used as part of the router’s local BGP policy decisions,
e.g., filtering routes that reflect invalid announcements or
preferring valid ones. While the RPKI is fairly populated
with ROAs and growing [9, 15, 23, 24], adoption of ROV and
filtering has been negligible, according to operator gossip. A
major reason for this is the lack of economic incentives. Since
a significant share of invalid routes are due to misconfigura-
tion [23], adopting ROV and filtering can even have adverse
effects such as a loss of connectivity to legitimate network
destinations.
A recent paper examined RPKI and ROV adoption from
multiple angles, focusing on the slow state of ROV adoption,
the security implications of partial adoption, and reasons
for slow adoption. The paper also identifies an attack vector
that exploits loose ROAs to hijack traffic of a RPKI-secured
prefix [5]. To capture the current state of limited adoption,
the paper included a measurement study that claimed that
most large AS had not deployed ROV, but that 9 of the
100 largest AS had. This result was based on observations
of existing BGP routes from BGP route collectors, meaning
that the experiments were uncontrolled. At a basic level, the
approach finds an AS that originates both valid and invalid
announcements, then identifies other AS that appear on paths
towards the valid prefix but not on paths towards the invalid
prefix. It then assumes these AS are performing ROV to filter
invalid routes.
In this paper, we contribute a verifiable methodology for
measuring ROV after demonstrating that the above approach
to identify ROV adoption, based on passive observation of
routes in uncontrolled experiments [5], has three major limita-
tions. First, our measurements show that its characterizations
of some networks change depending on which set of BGP
collectors is used, inferring ROV adoption in some cases when
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it definitely has not been deployed and not inferring it in
some cases when it may have been deployed. Second, the ap-
proach relies on invalid routes that happen to be announced,
and so its coverage is limited by their rare nature [8]. Third,
we conducted supplemental measurements suggesting that
most networks flagged by the approach (and by [5]) as using
ROV are actually avoiding invalid routes for unrelated (non-
security) traffic engineering purposes, without checking ROV
status. This means that adoption is likely even lower than
suggested by the earlier study. In fact, with only uncontrolled
measurements of existing routes—the status quo for Internet
research—it is impossible to differentiate between multiple
feasible explanations.
To overcome challenges of measuring route origin val-
idation (§ 2) and the limitations of uncontrolled experi-
ments (§ 3), we propose a method to accurately infer ROV
policies using controlled experiments (§ 4) that manipulate
both BGP announcements and the ROAs that apply to them.
We discuss the operational concerns related to ROV deploy-
ment and sketch a roadmap for further, more general mea-
surements (§ 5). We provide initial results using our method,
verified by ground truth.
Although ROV adoption is low and slow, our proposed
method allows accurate, longitudinal observation of ROV
adoption across the Internet.
2 THE CHALLENGES OF MEASURING
ROUTE ORIGIN VALIDATION
Limited visibility. Measuring the deployment of ROV is chal-
lenging because of very limited visibility of routing decisions,
which has multiple causes. First, an AS does not propagate
every path it knows, instead selecting a best path to each des-
tination prefix and then choosing for each neighbor whether
to export that best path. So, BGP hides information by only
forwarding a subset of available paths to a subset of neigh-
bors. Second, an AS can use arbitrary policy to select a best
path and to decide which neighbors to forward it to, and
this policy is opaque. The policy may reflect concerns such
as business relationships and traffic engineering, as well as
route origin validity, and so it can be very difficult to discern
the cause of any observed decision. Third, the interactions of
these policies can influence the decisions of seemingly unin-
volved AS, meaning that it is not enough to observe a path
before and after a change to understand which AS caused
the change [10]. Fourth, as researchers, we typically have
a limited view of the Internet, with projects such as RIPE
RIS [18] and RouteViews [22] collecting routes from a small
number of AS, many of which only provide their routes to a
limited set of destinations [16]. This makes it hard to locate
where routes diverge or whether differences are due to actual
filtering or simply lack of visibility.
Lack of controlled experiments. We distinguish between two
experimental methods, controlled and uncontrolled. In a
controlled experiment, researchers vary one factor of interest
(whether a route is valid) while fixing other factors, then
measure the outcome (which route an AS uses), observing
how networks route under different scenarios of interest to
the current research question [10, 21]. In an uncontrolled
experiment, the factor of interest varies outside the control
of the researchers and independent of the current research
question (AS on the Internet happen to announce a mix of
valid and invalid routes), and researchers measure outcomes.
Our classification of controlled versus uncontrolled de-
scribes experiments (how to test a hypothesis). It is orthog-
onal to the classification of passive versus active measure-
ments (how data are collected), and passive versus active
measurements are orthogonal to control plane versus data
plane measurements (what data are collected). With uncon-
trolled experiments, inferring root causes of routing decisions
is challenging because pinpointing the reason for the deci-
sion (e.g., RPKI policy or traffic engineering) is difficult
when path attributes and RPKI data cannot be manipulated
independently to observe their impact on decisions.
Implementation variations. Uncontrolled experiments are
most challenged when the baseline of the system is unclear
or complex. The deployment of ROV introduces additional
variations in implementation and configuration (e.g., ROA
propagation delay [13], route revalidation because of ROA
change) that have not yet been explored but likely affect
measurement outcome.
3 REVISITING UNCONTROLLED
EXPERIMENTS
A previous approach for detecting ROV deployment used
uncontrolled passive measurements [5]. This study did not
release the code and data sources needed to reproduce it.
In this section, we try to replicate some of the results and
analyze how reliably the method leads to the conclusions.
We show that the limited view provided by vantage points
can lead to incorrect identification of ROV non-adoption and
ROV adoption. Our analysis shows that differences in AS
paths towards valid and invalid announcements are mainly a
measurement artifact, instead of evidence for filtering.
To be clear on terminology, a route collector is a BGP
router that peers with border routers of various AS, each of
which we refer to as a vantage point [20].
3.1 Uncontrolled Method
The previous approach uses available BGP dumps and RPKI
data to estimate a lower bound for ROV non-adoption and
identify ROV filtering [5]. It compares AS paths taken by
known ROV valid and known ROV invalid announcements
from a single AS to a single vantage point. If the paths differ,
it assumes that the invalid announcement was filtered by
ROV on the path taken by the valid announcement, causing
the divergence. This approach does not distinguish between a
single router or an entire AS using ROV-based filtering, since
it makes inferences based on the AS that appear on AS paths
to vantage points. The method analyzes routes exported by
vantage points as follows:
Exclude AS observed to use invalid routes. First, any AS that
is found on a path of an invalid announcement is flagged as
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non ROV enforcing. This assumes that any AS that accepts
any invalid route accepts all invalid routes; i.e., AS do not
implement selective filtering or use other policies that can
accept some invalid routes while filtering others. An exception
is made for invalid announcements originated by the vantage
point’s AS or by one of its customers [5], as an AS may make
exceptions for its customers.
Identify AS that may be performing ROV filtering. For each
vantage point, the approach identifies all AS observed to
originate at least one non-invalid (either valid or not in the
RPKI database) prefix announcement and at least one invalid
announcement. It then compares each non-invalid path (from
the origin to the vantage point) to each invalid path. If there
is exactly one AS that (i) appears on the non-invalid path
but not the invalid path, and (ii) has not been flagged as non
ROV enforcing, the approach marks it as an ROV candidate
for announcements from that origin.
For example, the vantage point 𝑉 might observe the follow-
ing paths for the non-invalid prefix announcements 𝑃1−2 and
invalid prefix announcements 𝑃3−4 advertised from origin 𝑂:
𝑃1 : 𝑂 → 𝐴→ 𝐶 → 𝑉 not found
𝑃2 : 𝑂 → 𝐴→ 𝐸 → 𝑉 valid
𝑃3 : 𝑂 → 𝐴→ 𝐷 → 𝑉 invalid
𝑃4 : 𝑂 → 𝐴→ 𝐷 → 𝑉 invalid
In this case, AS 𝐶 and AS 𝐸 are marked as ROV candidates
for origin 𝑂, unless they have been previously marked as non
ROV enforcing.
Select filtering AS. The approach then counts the number of
origins for which it marked an AS as an ROV candidate and,
following previous work [5], classifies an AS marked for at
least 3 origins as ROV enforcing.
3.2 Data Set and Comparison with Current
Findings
Data Set. The previous study [5] specifies the data set they
have used to be from July 2016, collected from 44 Routeviews
vantage points. It does not mention which vantage points
explicitly. Our analysis is based on BGP RIB dumps gathered
from all route collectors of the RIPE RIS and Routeviews
projects from October 25th 2016, 16:00 UTC. This data set
includes 27GB of exported routes from 960 vantage points, a
larger data set than the previous study has used. The data
exported by the vantage points includes routes to both IPv4
and IPv6 prefixes.
Reproducing existing methodology.We reproduced the method-
ology from the description in the previous study [5], since the
original code is not available. Analyzing our complete data
set using the uncontrolled method, it classifies the following
AS as ROV enforcing :
𝐴𝑆8100 𝐴𝑆25761 𝐴𝑆17819 𝐴𝑆262150
None of these AS is among the top-100 AS, based on the
CAIDA AS rank [4]. This result differs from previous mea-
surements [5], which used a different set of RIB dumps to
conclude that 9 of the top 100 AS enforce ROV. We want to
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Figure 1: Uncontrolled, passive measurements: Statistical im-
pact of vantage points on the number of identified AS (5,000
samples of 44 randomly selected vantage points).
better understand the validity of the method and why results
vary significantly.
3.3 Impact of Limited Vantage Point Sets
When we run the same analysis on a subset of our data, such
as data from a single route collector, the results differ. For
example, the routeviews-equix collector has a feed from 34
vantage points, yet running the same analysis just on this
feed results in zero AS marked as ROV enforcing. In contrast,
the routeviews-wide collector has feeds from only 4 vantage
points, but shows the following AS as ROV enforcing :
𝐴𝑆48237 𝐴𝑆262150 𝐴𝑆3786
Out of those 3 AS, 𝐴𝑆48237 and 𝐴𝑆3786 are both found
on the AS paths of invalid routes when considering data
from the route-views4 collector, classifiying them as non
ROV enforcing, contradicting the previous ROV enforcing
classification. This shows that using the uncontrolled method-
ology some AS might be (mis)classified as ROV enforcing
if the invalid announcements they propagate are not visible
in the data set, leading to false positives. We define an AS
as a false positive if it is classified as ROV enforcing using
data set 𝑑1, but classified as non ROV enforcing using data
set 𝑑2, with 𝑑1 encompassing 𝑑2. On the other hand, some
AS that are classified as ROV enforcing in a more complete
data set might not be visible enough in a smaller data set to
result in a classification as ROV enforcing, leading to false
negatives compared to the full data set. For example, using
the complete data set, the approach marks AS8100 as an
ROV candidate for origins AS6921, AS46562, and AS46261.
It is thus flagged as ROV enforcing. When looking only at
the data from the routeviews-wide collector, AS8100 is only
marked as ROV candidate for a single origin, AS46562, and
thus it is not classified as ROV enforcing.
This shows that results vary significantly depending on
which set of vantage points the data is taken from. To quantify
the impact of this we select 44 Routeviews vantage points
(the number used in previous work [5]) and calculate the
number of AS identified in each step of the method (see
§ 3.1). Figure 1 summarizes statistical properties (quartiles,
extreme non-outliers, and outliers) of 5,000 random samples
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(b) Relative frequency of false
positives
Figure 2: Number of misclassified ROV enforcing AS in
different vantage point sets.
of 44 vantage points, showing that, even for a fixed number of
vantage points, results can vary widely depending on which
vantage points are used. Results for a single selection of
vantage points may not reliably determine a lower bound
of either deployment or non-deployment. Figure 2 depicts
the number of false positives of ROV enforcing AS, those
classified as enforcing given sampled subsets of 44 vantage
points but non-enforcing based on the global data set. For
82% of the samples, the ratio of false positives is 50% or
more.
Conclusion. Using BGP RIB dumps as a basis for uncon-
trolled measurements of ROV filtering (or non-filtering) is
problematic. It makes inferences based on routes visible in
the selected dumps, but lacks complete visibility of the global
Internet, leading to misclassification.
3.4 Impact of Limited Prefix Visibility at VPs
Recall that the existing approach to identify ROV filtering
compares paths for invalid announcements with paths for
non-invalid (i.e., valid or unknown) announcements. We have
shown that the selection of vantage points has a major impact
on classification using this approach. As the approach uses
pairs of non-invalid and invalid announcements, it relies on
vantage points receiving such announcements from enough
origins to reveal their policies.
Combining all dumps from the RIPE RIS and Routeviews
projects, we have data from 960 vantage points. But, not
all vantage points provide routes to the same set of prefixes.
Some vantage points have a near global view, while some
have routes for only a very limited number of prefixes.
For each vantage point, Figure 3(a) shows the number of
prefixes received via invalid announcements (top) and the
number of distinct origins originating these announcements
(bottom). Though some vantage points provide routes for
invalid prefix announcements to nearly 1000 distinct origin
AS, more than 36% of the vantage points see less than the
needed 3 AS originating invalid prefix announcements. This
observation is independent of the RPKI deployment state.
Figure 3(b) shows the relative ratio of visible prefixes per
origin and vantage point. Those vantage points that see many
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Figure 3: Number of prefixes and origin AS observed by RIPE
and Routeviews.
prefixes lack a complete view with respect to all prefixes per
origin.
Conclusion. Assuming one applies the method with only a
subset of VPs as in the previous work [5], selecting vantage
points with very limited prefix visibility misses a significant
portion of origin AS, and thus underestimates the set of ROV
candidates and can lead to misclassification.
3.5 Impact of Limited Control
Just because a vantage point uses different routes to reach a
non-invalid and an invalid prefix from the same origin does not
imply that the difference is caused by ROV-based filtering,
as invalid and non-invalid advertisements might differ in
attributes other than RPKI validity. We now investigate
traffic engineering as another possible explanation (unrelated
to BGP security) for observed differences. For a multi-homed
AS, a common technique to influence inbound traffic is to
announce different prefixes to different upstreams. These
prefixes often overlap, e.g., an AS may announce a more
specific prefix (a /24) via upstream 𝐴 and the covering prefix
(a /16) via upstream 𝐵 to shift traffic to 𝐴. Studies comparing
current ROAs to announced prefixes have shown that the
major cause for invalid BGP announcements is issuing a ROA
only for a prefix and then announcing subprefixes [6, 9, 23]
which are not covered by the ROA. Announcing the /16 and
/24 to separate providers then results in two routes, one valid
and one invalid, diverging on the first hop of the AS path.
For each vantage point, Figure 4 shows the fraction of
prefixes from invalid announcements that are covered by a
prefix from a non-invalid announcement from the same origin.
An invalid prefix only counts as covered if the vantage point
sees both the route to the invalid prefix and a route for the
covering non-invalid prefix. For the vantage points between
𝑥 = 0, 275, roughly 80% of prefixes from invalid announce-
ments are covered by a non-invalid from the same origin.
This strongly suggests that the prefixes are invalid because of
incorrect ROA configuration and the announcements perhaps
subject to traffic engineering.
Next, we investigate where the vantage points’ paths to
these invalid prefixes diverge from their paths to the covering
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Figure 4: Fraction of invalid prefixes covered by a valid less-
specific prefix from the same origin.
prefixes. Figure 5 shows the distribution of divergence points
for all vantage points. The 𝑦-axis sorts the vantage points
by the number of invalid prefixes they provide routes to.
The coloring of the 𝑥-axis depicts the fraction of these paths
that diverged a given number of hops from the origin. The
majority of AS paths of invalid routes either share the AS
path of the covering non-invalid (𝑥=“Same path”) or diverge
at the first hop, as would occur with traffic engineering.
Conclusion. ROV-based filtering is not the only plausible
explanation for instances of vantage points using different
routes to reach non-invalid and invalid prefixes from the same
origin. We found that most instances display signatures of
traffic engineering, and, during our study, we also observed a
router selecting different routes from the same origin AS due
to route age (a BGP tiebreaker).
4 CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS
With uncontrolled, passive experiments, it can be impossible
to determine whether an AS is actually filtering or whether it
is not using invalid advertisements because of other attributes.
Further, the AS where the divergence occurred need not be
the one that made a different decision, as it could have been
presented with different options for its decisions. To overcome
misclassification, experiments must clearly establish whether
decisions stem from ROA status.
Controlled experiments provide a means to establish this
causation despite our limited visiblity into routing decisions.
Based on the challenges in measuring ROV adoption (§2)
and our experiences evaluating the existing approach (§3),
we arrive at the following requirements for a more reliable
methodology.
Experiments must be long-lived. Adoption is likely to be
slow, and may be bursty, driven by various initiatives and
technologies. Measurements must be rerun periodically.
Experiments must be active and controlled. Passive observa-
tions of existing announcements are insufficient to determine
a policy since we do not know precisely how the announce-
ments are being made (i.e., traffic engineering or not) and
route collectors may not provide the right vantage to locate
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Figure 5: Divergent AS hop distribution of invalid prefixes
with covering non-invalid prefixes of same origin.
filtering. Furthermore, we need to coordinate announcements
with ROA changes to precisely expose policies.
Experiments require rich BGP connectivity. From a single
vantage point, it is difficult to infer which network along a
path is filtering an announcement.
4.1 Basic Approach
We describe an approach based on active, controlled manipu-
lation of BGP announcements and RPKI ROAs. We use the
PEERING testbed, which allows us to make BGP announce-
ments for prefixes we control from PEERING sites around the
world to the hundreds of networks it peers with [21]. We use
multiple /24 prefixes from the same /16 block. These prefixes
share the same route object in the Internet Routing Reg-
istry. To control ROAs, we run a grandchild RPKI Certificate
Authority (CA) in the RIPE region, enabling us to program-
matically issue and revoke Resource Certificates and ROAs.
Common RPKI cache server implementations by default up-
date at an interval of 10 to 60 minutes. To guard against
uncommonly long ROA propagation delays, we conservatively
keep every configuration (set of BGP announcements and
ROA states) in place for eight hours.
In our basic approach, an AS must fulfill two assumptions
to allow us to unambiguously determine whether the AS is
using ROV-based filtering: (i) connected-assumption. The
network peers with PEERING, either directly or using a route
server. (ii) visibility-assumption. The network offers some
means to check the BGP route it uses to reach an Internet
destination, either via a Looking Glass or via a vantage point.
While the connected assumption is limiting, it is necessary
to maintain accuracy, relaxing it to allow networks that are
not peers of PEERING introduces ambiguity. We discuss the
possibility of relaxing the connected assumption, as well as
the visibility assumption, in section 5.
We announce two prefixes via PEERING (AS47065), a
reference prefix 𝑃𝑅 and an experiment prefix 𝑃𝐸 . We peri-
odically change RPKI state for the experiment prefix, using
an additional origin AS 𝑂 to alternate between the following
configurations:
(C1) ROA specifies AS47065 is valid for 𝑃𝑅 and 𝑃𝐸 , so
both announcements are valid.
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(C2) ROA specifies AS47065 is valid for 𝑃𝑅, AS 𝑂 is valid
for 𝑃𝐸 . AS47065’s announcement of 𝑃𝐸 is invalid.
We check the routes a vantage point chooses to both prefixes
during both configurations. The reference prefix always has a
valid RPKI state so should not be filtered via ROV, and so
we omit any vantage points at which 𝑃𝑅 is not visible. We
expect both prefixes to be treated the same as long as both
announcements are valid, and so we omit a vantage point if it
uses different routes during configuration C1. Analysing only
data from vantage points that pass both these requirements
eliminates the problem of limited visibility, since there is no
missing data anymore. We then check the routes a vantage
point has chosen after the announcement of the expermiment
prefix becomes invalid. Three observations might occur: (O1)
𝑉 has the same route for both prefixes 𝑃𝐸 and 𝑃𝑅. (O2) 𝑉
has a different route for prefix 𝑃𝐸 . (O3) 𝑉 has no route to
𝑃𝐸 .
In the cases of O2 and O3, we know that this route change
must be because of the RPKI status change. Had it been
for another reason we would expect a change in route for
the reference prefix as well. The reference prefix combined
with the ROA changes thus all but eliminates the problem of
limited control. The experiments are repeated continuously
to confirm the behaviour is consistent.
4.2 Measurements and Results
Experiment Reach. The experiments were conducted using
PEERING BGP routers in Amsterdam and Seattle. The device
in Amsterdam peers with 589 different AS, either directly or
via a routeserver at AMS-IX. The device in Seattle peers with
179 different AS either directly or via a routeserver at SIX.
In total, via these two location PEERING peers with 730 AS.
Out of these 730 AS, only 138 AS peer with a RIPE RIS or
Routeviews route collector. Out of those 138 vantage points,
68 actually export direct routes for prefixes announced by
PEERING.
Results. These experiments were performed February 20-27,
May 11-17, and August 1-7, 2017. In our experiments in
February and May 2017, we found AS8283, AS50300, and
AS59715 were using ROV to filter invalid announcements.
AS8283 and AS50300 comply with both of our assumptions.
The experiments in August show AS50300 and AS59715 to
be filtering, but not AS8283.
AS8283 was identified based on observation (O3), and
AS50300 based on (O2). It is worth noting that AS50300 only
filtered routes learned via a route server at the Amsterdam
exchange (AMSIX). This contradicts one of the assumption in
the methodology studied in section 3, whereas it is assumed
that an AS found on the AS path of an invalid route does
not use ROV based filtering.
AS59715 was not directly connected to PEERING but lead
to (O3). For all three AS we contacted the operators via
email and they confirmed that they used ROV based filtering.
In the case of AS8283, they confirmed that they had shut off
ROV based filtering for technical reasons in July 2017. This
confirms our findings from August 2017.
Relaxing the connected-assumption in the basic approach
lead to ambiguity since multiple AS can be on the path
between PEERING and a vantage point. To deal with cases
such as AS59715 precisely, we propose a roadmap for a more
general approach in the next section.
5 ROADMAP
5.1 Operational Concerns
ROA Propagation Time. Analysis of our experiments has
shown that the time for some AS to receive newly issued
ROAs can be up to 8 hours or more. We have also observed
that the propagation time for some AS is inconsistent and
varies by up to 2 hours. It is not clear yet whether this is due
to RPKI cache servers updating infrequently or due to BGP
routers using excessively long refresh intervals.
Considering implementation variations. Active RPKI experi-
ments require a careful check of router implementations [3].
For a router to perform ROV when an existing route changes
from valid to invalid (due to an RPKI change), the BGP
implementation must (i) receive the new ROA payload and
(ii) recalculate the best path for this existing entry. We veri-
fied that Cisco and Juniper implementations do recalculate
the best path upon ROA changes, however there are corner
cases where certain Cisco implementations do not re-apply
route-maps that change BGP path attributes based on RPKI
validation. This might lead to a filtering AS to go unnoticed
by our basic approach. To detect such cases we have set up
a second set of experiments in which the BGP announce-
ments are withdrawn prior to the ROA changes and then
reannounced once the new ROAs have propagated. We have
timed these announcements in such a way to minimize risk
of BGP dampening. So far we have found no additional AS
to be filtering in these experiments.
Analyzing router implementations in more detail, analyzing
the consistency among RPKI cache servers, and measuring
ROA propagation time to routers is part of our ongoing work.
5.2 Extending Controlled Experiements
Going forward, we plan to generalize our approach by conduct-
ing additional experiments, but also relaxing our assumptions
without sacrificing the precise conclusions enabled by tightly
controlled experiments.
Relaxing connected-assumption. Suppose the target does
not connect directly to PEERING and has no route to 𝑃𝐸 .
It might check ROAs or might not receive a route from any
neighbor. To narrow our policy inferences, we use two tech-
niques. First, we iteratively target networks in a breadth-first
search outwards from a PEERING site, similar to an approach
that we used to uncover (non-security-related) routing poli-
cies [1]. Second, we will make multiple observations and only
consider inferences consistent with all observations. We will
make multiple observations both by using vantage points
across the Internet and by targeting a network with different
announcements. We can vary the announcements by changing
which PEERING sites we use, which peers we announce to,
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review Volume 48 Issue 1, January 2018
and what BGP attributes we use to influence route selection
and propagation.
Relaxing visibility-assumption. Lacking a BGP feed from
a network, we can measure the data plane. This is straightfor-
ward if it has a traceroute server or RIPE Atlas probe [19]. If
not, we can ping a destination in the target network and check
the PEERING site the reply arrives at, or use our Reverse
Traceroute [11].
Inferring complex RPKI policies. A network may prefer valid
routes over invalid but not drop invalid routes. In order to
test for such policies, experiments must fulfil an additional
requirement:
Experiments require competing announcements. To identify
prefer-valid policies, we need multiple simultaneous an-
nouncements for the same addresses. Since a single BGP
session generally allows only a single announcement, the
experiment must include sessions with multiple peers.
In order to test for such policies we announce two prefixes
𝑃𝑅 and 𝑃𝐸 identically, each from two different locations with
two different ASN (61575 and 61576).
Initially, we configure ROAs in such a way that announce-
ments for 𝑃𝑅 from both origin AS are valid, and announce-
ments for 𝑃𝐸 are invalid. We then announce 𝑃𝑅 and 𝑃𝐸
exclusively from AS61575 and check whether vantage points
will receive these routes. We repeat the same step for AS61576.
Once we have confirmed vantage points receive routes for 𝑃𝑅
and 𝑃𝐸 from both origin AS, we announce both prefixes from
both origin AS simultaneously. Throughout the experiment,
all announcements for the reference prefix 𝑃𝑅 will stay valid,
while announcements for 𝑃𝐸 will vary like this:
(C1) ROA specifies AS61575. Announcement of 𝑃𝐸 from
AS61575 is valid, from AS61576 is invalid.
(C2) ROA specifies AS61576. Announcement of 𝑃𝐸 from
AS61576 is valid, from AS61575 is invalid.
A vantage point might initially choose the route to AS61576
for both prefixes 𝑃𝑅 and 𝑃𝐸 . If the vantage point then
switches to the route to AS61575 for prefix 𝑃𝐸 during config-
uration C1, this indicates a preference for valid routes over
invalid routes. An even stronger indicator of this policy is
when the vantage point then again switches its route for 𝑃𝐸
to AS61576 when configuration C2 begins. We can attribute
these route changes to a prefer-valid policy, rather than a
filter-invalid policy, since we have ensured that vantage
points will choose invalid routes for 𝑃𝐸 from both origin
AS. This reasoning works the same way if the vantage point
chooses the route to AS61575 for prefix 𝑃𝑅.
We can differentiate these policies by configuring announce-
ments from PEERING in such a way that a target network
receives different combinations of valid and invalid prefi-
xes through clients, peers, and providers, then observing its
decisions.
There are subtleties in checking prefer-valid policies,
as a network is “allowed” to use ROA status as one part of
checking how preferred a path is, but, for example, it may
prefer invalid peer routes over valid provider routes but not
over valid peer routes. We will explore how best to capture
these policies, building on our work on using PEERING to
uncover (non-security-related) routing policies [1].
5.3 Establishing a Monitoring Platform
We will deploy our methods on a live, publicly available
monitoring platform: https://rov.rpki.net. Our measurements
will run on an at least weekly basis, to report about the
ongoing deployment of RPKI-based route origin validation
and filtering. We hope that these results will not only help
researchers to better understand new security protocols but
also operators to identify mistakes and consider motivation
in deployment.
With a longitudinal rather than one-off study, we can eval-
uate the impact of efforts that, for example, routing registries,
Internet exchange points, vendor updates, and operator or-
ganizations make to encourage BGP security adoption. Mea-
surements of the effect of such campaigns may yield a better
understanding of how to spur uptake. With an Internet-wide
characterization, our data may inform best practices, encour-
age adoption, and reveal topics worthy of study, and provide
the basis for understanding overall coverage and effectiveness.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed steps and results towards a rigor-
ous methodology for measuring adoption of RPKI route vali-
dation and filtering. We showed that BGP data sets that are
incomplete with respect to peering relations—as are all avail-
able public data sets—challenge any method based on passive
uncontrolled experiments. We discussed several pitfalls. We
identified that traffic engineering, combined with negligent
ROA configurations, are largely responsible for the routing
differences between invalids and non-invalids. To allow for
more solid conclusions, we argue for controlled experiments.
In fact, our measurements in February, May, and August 2017
revealed three AS that already deploy RPKI-based filtering,
which has been confirmed by the operators.
By controlling our own announcements, we can uncover
policies proactively, yielding a richer understanding of adop-
tion and configurations than is possible via passive observa-
tion of existing announcements; and potentially uncovering
issues before they would otherwise manifest. Our ongoing
measurements focus on RPKI validation at locations with
high impact such as Internet exchange points. Notably AMS-
IX started filtering invalid routes by default at route servers
on October 20, 2017. Our public measurement platform will
report on this.
Reproducibility
We make all source code as well as data used for both our
attempt at replication of the uncontrolled methodology of [5]
as well as our presented controlled methodology available
at https://github.com/RPKI/rov-measurement-code. Our
platform to continuously monitoring ROV adoption will be
publicly available via http://rov.rpki.net.
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